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Global and Regional Organisations

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This chapter traces the evolution of regional organisations in Asia – in particular East and Southeast Asia – and the engagement of these regions with global international organisations. A number of themes will form the background for this analysis, and these relate both to the longstanding challenges of regional cooperation and the more recent implications of the shifting global balance of power. Asia has historically had difficulty in developing regional mechanisms – including organisations – for dealing with collective challenges. Bilateral relationships and informal alliances have characterised the region, and a history of major armed conflict – and the legacy of this conflict – has obstructed cooperation, as have ongoing political conflicts between key states. The Westphalian political culture of the region, with an emphasis upon state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference, has also hindered institutionalised regional cooperation.

Asia's engagement with regional and global organisations has reflected the changing international environment of recent decades. There has been a global shift of focus to Asia in terms of economic growth and this has driven growing success in the economic field regionally. Asia's engagement with international organisations – and to some extent the politics of regional organisations – reflects the dynamics of the transitional international order, and in particular the 'rise' of non-Western countries. This has resulted in Asia pushing back against 'Western-led' institutions/norms, and creating alternative multilateral arrangements, and it has generated contestation around the norms of international society and control of the international agenda. In addition, there are questions about the future US presence in Asia as a function of this changing international order, particularly with regard to its relationship with key allies such as South Korea and Japan, and

its rivalry with China. A study of Asia's regional and international organisations therefore raises questions related to the key political trends of the region. Will the global economic shift towards Asia spur new incentives for regionalism, overcoming historical obstacles to closer cooperation? Will the global transition in power – in which Asia is a driving force – affect the dynamics of Asia's regional cooperation and its engagement with global organisations? Will Asia promote normative changes in terms of the principles that underpin regional and global organisations? What are the implications of the possible decline of US hegemony; will it facilitate greater regional cooperation in the longer term, or result in destabilisation and conflict? What leadership can rising states – in particular, China – show in the future evolution of regional organisation in Asia?

THE EVOLVING CONTEXT: THE RISE OF DIVIDED ASIA

It is widely accepted that the rise of Asia – and particularly China – has had a structural impact upon international relations, in the context of a broader shift in international order.[1] This raises interesting implications for the dynamics of regional cooperation and Asia's engagement with global organisations. At the same time, Asia is beset by political problems and rivalries which have hampered cooperation.[2] These themes provide the broader political context for this examination of regional and global organisations and this section will sketch these themes.

First, Asia is now a key driving force of the global economy, and it has experienced spectacular economic growth for a number of decades, even if this growth is not evenly distributed and is slowing. A number of countries, such as China, Indonesia, India, Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand, among others, have taken the lead in this. This has provided immense incentives for regional cooperation in economic areas such as finance and trade, but also for political cooperation more broadly. There has been a surge in bilateral and multilateral free trade arrangements – in particular associated with ASEAN and East Asian economies – and these have been a defining feature of the global economy and Asia's relationship with the rest of the world. However, economic growth has also generated internal pressure for political and functional cooperation, and this is widely regarded as the key challenge for future economic success.

Second, despite the incentives for cooperation, there have been acute difficulties in establishing durable collective action mechanisms at the regional level in Asia, in areas such as collective security, environmental management and political cooperation. Compared with the sub-regions of Africa, Latin America and Europe, Asia registers the lowest number of regional organisations. Asia's vast size means that it is in fact not a 'region' but rather a number of separate regions or sub-regions, comprising very different economic, social and developmental experiences and interests. The challenge of regional cooperation is therefore

not comparable with Western Europe or the Americas in terms of the range of divergent interests that need to be accommodated. In addition, Asia hosts a range of political and sometimes military conflicts, many of which are the legacy of a deeply troubled history, which make it difficult to establish cooperation and organisations. The legacy of historical conflicts related to the Second World War and the Cold War, and new territorial conflicts, are manifested in suspicion and animosity between many of the key countries in the region. Against this background, regional suspicions and rivalries take on a particular sensitivity, such as the conflict between China and a number of its neighbours regarding access to, and the territorial rights in, the South China Sea.

Third, even where sub-regional organisations have been established – notably, in Southeast Asia – the political culture of the region, underscored by its fractious history, has tended to make countries very sensitive towards issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity and 'interference'. As a result, commitment to the principles of reciprocity, give and take, and to political cooperation has been quite shallow, and regional initiatives have tended to be conservative in nature. Furthermore, there has not been much expectation that organisations such as ASEAN would be able to make radical decisions in relation to pressing challenges, or to apply coercion to individual members if seen to be collectively necessary. Rather, they are more likely to perform the simple function of a forum for discussion and coordination.

Fourth, the evolution of regional cooperation in Southeast and East Asia, and its engagement with global politics, including international organisations, will reflect the shifting international order, and in particular the 'rise' of China. The international order is undergoing a fundamental transition, and this is likely to define international politics in the 21st century. While this process is the subject of debate and controversy, there is broad agreement that key non-Western states, including some in Asia, are rising in power and influence in an increasingly multipolar world. This is evident in economic performance, diplomatic influence, and the exercise of both hard and, to a lesser extent, soft power. Simultaneously, there is wide, although not uncontested, agreement about the relative decline in influence of established Western powers.[3] The 'transitional international order' is therefore a central, but often ambiguous, theme in both policy and academic debates. These debates generally focus upon the distribution of material resources, declining and emerging powers, and the consequences of this for international institutions, public goods and the management of shared needs and challenges.

One of the central themes running through the literature on rising powers is whether the new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order.[4] In some ways Asia is pushing back against Western-led institutions and norms, and creating alternative multilateral arrangements. To some extent this represents contestation around the norms of international society and control of the international agenda. At the same time, engagement with existing global norms has served the interests of Asian countries, and so it is unlikely that they – even China – are

truly ‘revisionist’ in terms of the institutions of international order. Rather, some rising powers seek greater access to, and representation in, the institutions and processes which define, administer and uphold international rules.[5] For example, China appears to wish to avoid confrontation with the West through their pursuit of a ‘Go West’ strategy rather than southern expansion. Furthermore, as Kishore Mahbubani argues, China, and the other economies of Asia, are simply trying to rise to similar levels of prosperity and to achieve political parity with the United States and the West.[6] The apparent ‘threat’, as Peter Shearman notes, is China’s situated otherness as the United States’ latest ‘evil empire’.[7] Rising powers, including the BRICS, are largely integrated into the existing institutions and forms of global governance, and they have shown little desire to take on a *global* leadership role. Nevertheless, the rise of Asia and its engagement with regional and global international organisations does raise broader questions of whether Asia is ‘converging’ with the West politically and economically in an era of globalisation, or whether Asian regional organisations would be fundamentally ‘different’, and whether, most importantly, China is challenging pre-existing organisational arrangements.

Fifth, and finally, the evolution of regional organisation raises questions about the future US presence in Asia, as a function of this changing international order, and in particular its apparent declining strategic reach. The election of US President Donald Trump in 2016 – someone who had clearly signalled that US allies in the region would not be able to count on indefinite or unconditional support in the future – also pointed to a declining commitment to the region. The United States’ role in organisations in East and Southeast Asia is often contradictory, demonstrating a hegemonic desire to protect its established organisational power in the face of shifting local circumstances. This refers to the US tendency to protect the role of multilateral organisations over which it has control by quashing local initiatives and maintaining its bilateral authority with various security partners in the region. Yet despite these efforts, the United States and the organisations it supports often appear incapable of dealing with the many protracted issues in the region. This raises important implications for allies such as South Korea and Japan, but also for rivals such as China which may feel empowered by doubts about the US commitment to the region. This is relevant to regional organisations in a number of ways, and raises further questions. Historically, has the presence of the United States hindered the development of regional cooperation by stifling regional entrepreneurship and exacerbating tensions between Asian states? What are the implications and consequences of the decline of US hegemony: will it facilitate greater regional cooperation in the longer term, or result in destabilisation and conflict? What leadership can Japan and China show in the future evolution of regional organisation in Asia, in an era of declining US hegemony?

As this section demonstrates, the evolution of Asia’s regional organisations and its engagement with international organisations raises broader questions about the politics of the region in a changing global order.

REGIONAL COOPERATION IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

A historical review of the formation of regional organisations reveals a number of phases (see Appendices A–D). Following the Second World War, colonial empires declined, independence movements arose and new political allegiances divided the region along Cold War lines. Emerging from this patchwork was the shifting bases for regional cooperation and organisational development. This uneven process can then be broadly characterised as developing in five often overlapping phases.

- Phase 1 (1918–1945): Colonialism and Empire Driven, with great power rivalries between the West and Japan around competing spheres of interest.
- Phase 2 (1945–1971): Security Driven, featuring the lingering dominance of Western actors, the divisions of the Cold War, independence movements, rising nationalism and neutrality in Southeast Asia.
- Phase 3 (1971–1991): Economics Driven, featuring an increasing role played by Japan and the core ASEAN members in regionalisation, and later to feature the transitioning of the Communist bloc.
- Phase 4 (1991–2015): Tentative political regionalisation, with the expansion and consolidation of the ASEAN project and the Asia-Pacific project.
- Phase 5 (2015–2025>): Globalisation Driven, involving a rising China, the US reaction and great power rivalries in Southeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea).

This evolution has reflected a strong tendency for formal cooperation if it is economic in nature, but a tendency to resist such cooperation if external powers are involved or if security issues are at stake. There is also a willingness to pursue organisations that are politico-diplomatic in nature, but for these to be weak and easily destabilised by intra-regional rivalries or divided by concerns about the intentions of global power actors. Furthermore, there is a hierarchy in the degrees of regional organisation in East and Southeast Asia, with organisations being strongest in Southeast Asia and weakest in the Asia-Pacific. The lack of intra-Northeast Asian cooperation leaves Southeast Asia as the strongest organisational wellspring of regional cooperation. Indeed, Southeast Asia has positioned itself to be the necessary bridge-builder for many broader organisational efforts, becoming what Yamamoto Yoshinobu characterises as a 'reverse hubs and spokes system' and what Evelin Goh calls Southeast Asia's 'omni-enmeshment' strategy.[8]

Consolidated Regional Organisations: the Primacy of Economics

East Asia is at the heart of a burgeoning global free trade movement. According to the World Trade Organisation, the close of the Cold War saw an increase in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), with a sharply rising number of cumulative RTAs in force every year, rising from around 50 in 1991 to a total of 423 by 2016.[9]

A great deal of this increase is accounted for by developments in East Asia. The Asian Development Bank's Asia Regional Integration Center statistics reveal that – especially from the turn of the millennium – the growth of Free Trade Arrangements (FTAs) in the region has risen exponentially at a rate of around 11 per year, resulting in 249 FTAs as of 2018 compared with just seven in 1991.[10] The leading 10 economies driving this process are (as of 2017 data): Singapore (33 FTAs), India (29), China (28), Korea (27), Japan (24), Thailand (23), Australia (22), Malaysia (22) and Indonesia (20). As this list indicates, aside from India and Australia, the drivers of this growth are largely the Northeast Asia and original core ASEAN-5 states.[11]

A key driving force of this trend is ASEAN and, with the coming into force in 2015 of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the most stable politico-economic organisation in the region came into being. The AEC rests on a staggered history of fragmented organisations. With the creation in 1947 of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), post-WWII economic cooperation was ostensibly multilaterally led. During the 1950s–1970s Southeast Asia split between pro-Western capitalist (Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, later Singapore), pro-Russia/China communist (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar) and neutral (Indonesia). It took until 1976 with the affirmation of political neutrality, a commitment to the primacy of economic development, and the acquiescence of Indonesia, before any serious organisation-building could occur. The Malaya Federation had earlier proposed the Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty in 1959, an ostensibly economics-based treaty that nonetheless held political integration potential. This failed due to opposition from Indonesia, but the proposal sparked the process that led to the Association of Southeast Asia from 1961 to 1967,[12] then the MAPHILINDO grouping from 1963 to 1967.[13] That served to allay Indonesia's suspicions of regional groupings, after which ASEAN was born in 1967 with Indonesia's full support.[14] The treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976) was signed by the core ASEAN-5 and the membership has been expanding ever since, developing into what has come to be called the 'ASEAN way': mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation among themselves. The core ASEAN-5 would dramatically increase their economic development while those that did not join languished in conflict.

By the 1980s, a glaring problem had become apparent: ASEAN, the Southeast Asia organisation, did not represent all of Southeast Asia. However this changed with the launching of a series of liberalisation reforms in China by Deng Xiaoping, and a path was beaten whereby Communist parties could remain in authority while simultaneously relinquishing their ideological opposition to the West and the free market.[15] China's reforms became replicated in 1986 in Vietnam's *doi moi*

(renovation) reforms, which then trickled down into Vietnam's 'little brother' of Laos with its *chintanakanmai* (new thinking) reforms.[16] ASEAN would subsequently become a patchwork of democratic, semi-democratic and Communist regimes, rather than the post-Cold War thawed site of the 'end of history' that some predicted.

Reconciliation with these more accommodating Communist countries facilitated the ability to: first, expand ASEAN politically into the 'late comers' (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam); second, attempt to bridge the economic gap between those latecomers and the core ASEAN economies; and third, better integrate ASEAN with itself, the wider world and to further develop pan-East Asia or pan-Pacific organisations. Expansion began quickly after 1991 to bring the latecomers into ASEAN, which Vietnam achieved in 1995, Laos and Burma in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999.

Attempts were quickly made to bridge the gap between the core ASEAN-5 and these newcomers. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and multilateral UN organisations began promoting the importance of sub-regional growth zones in the form of the Greater Mekong Sub-region project starting in 1992, the Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle in 1993 and the Brunei Darussalam–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area in 1994. These ostensibly economic projects, that nevertheless had clear underlying political goals,[17] were intended to 'pin together' all parts of ASEAN so as to cement the organisation's expansion and develop economic linkages between the core ASEAN-5 economies and the latecomer economies. Slow progress in bridging these gaps led to the Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam Development Triangle Area in 1999 and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration in 2000, both being attempts to deal with concerns over the slow pace of integration and to prevent any backward slippages that could risk post-Cold War ASEAN unity.[18]

Finally in relation to integration, important steps were taken by interested outside actors and ASEAN itself to quickly 'port' ASEAN into global level power frameworks. The highly significant 1992 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) achieved this by creating the Common Effective Preferential Tariff, positioning Southeast Asia as an investment and manufacturing hub. With the latecomer states trickling into ASEAN they also trickled into the AFTA, building it to become a highly important regional trade bloc that laid the foundations for deeper union with the 2015 ASEAN Economic Community. This shift was facilitated by Japan's 1988 Asian Network concept and concomitant desire to implement a Tokyo-oriented Asian Industries Development plan,[19] as the lead economy of the region began to structurally alter in ways that required external expansion.[20]

Furthermore, just as ASEAN was positioning itself as a vortex for wider inward economic investment, towards the end of the 1990s it also began projecting itself outwards to create wider, if limited in scope, regional economic attachments. In 1997, as an indication of a 'reverse hubs-and-spokes' organisational model,[21] it was agreed that ASEAN would bilaterally link with China, South Korea and Japan

with ASEAN+3. This finally created a substantive organisational link between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. This was significant because Northeast Asian states consistently found, and continue to find, it difficult to build cooperative organisations among themselves.[22] Simultaneously, the Asia–Europe Meetings began in 1996, interestingly using a framework that is of a more comprehensive and multi-dimensional character than is generally adopted between East Asian states themselves. The 2002 initiated Asia Cooperation Dialogue aimed at bridging the organisation between all of the other regional organisations in East Asia with the goal of an Asian Community organisation (although little on this has actually developed). And finally, this trend towards a reverse hubs-and-spokes organisation-building approach was used again in 2005, when ASEAN+3 broadened at the important East Asia Summit to ASEAN+6, which includes India, Australia and New Zealand.

In terms of broader East Asia or Pacific level organisations, the formation of the Japan (and US) chaired Asian Development Bank in 1966 and the Australia-initiated Pacific Basin Economic Council in 1967, coupled with the Pacific Trade and Development Conference in 1968, began to generate some semblance of wider regional organisation. With a shift of the conceptual boundaries from a geo-political towards a geographical definition (meaning any country touching the Pacific Ocean could be included), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organisation was founded in 1989. However the use of this 'Asia-Pacific' concept has geo-political overtones and demonstrates the US tendency to resist self-contained East Asia regionalism and China's rising influence. This was also the case with ASEAN+6 that was formed in 2005 in order to dilute ASEAN+3 by also including India, Australia and New Zealand.[23]

From around 2004, a flurry of differing proposals for greater regional trade-based organisations began to emerge. Some of these were clearly based more on geo-political power considerations rather than on the local capabilities or requirements of business in the region, as the growth of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) rather than multilateralised trade liberalisation became a key trend of the post-millennial period in East Asia. With ASEAN+3, Japan moved to propose the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA). Then once ASEAN+6 formed in 2009, Japan again moved to shift from bilateral regionalism to multilateral regionalism and proposed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA). Both proposals achieved only minimal success due to lukewarm support in ASEAN and a lack of cooperation among Northeast Asian states. Instead, ASEAN's own 2011 proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has superseded references to both EAFTA and CEPEA in extra-ASEAN negotiations. RCEP would appear to be a reaction to FTAs such as the US-led TPP that attempted to exclude China and thereby limit ASEAN's flexibility in extra-ASEAN relations.[24] China's proposal for an East Asia-wide FTA in 2014, in the form of the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), is further evidence of this and is placing ASEAN in a difficult political position of having to choose between FTAs.

There have also been efforts to broaden ASEAN's global links even further. Connections are being made with Africa (building on the 1955 Asian African Conference and the 2005 New Asian–African Strategic Partnership), with the Middle East from 2009 (with the ASEAN–Gulf Cooperation Council ministerial meetings) and with Latin America from 2015 (with the ASEAN–Pacific Alliance).

Failed Organisational Proposals: the Problem of Great Powers and Security

It has been possible to generate a degree of institutionalised cooperation that is economically driven, Southeast Asia-centred and 'soft' (rather than EU-style 'hard'). However, there is a strong tendency *against* organisation-building in East Asia when security exists as the major issue, especially when great power actors have had an interest in the outcome (see Appendix 14.B). Security and inter-imperial rivalries were the original antecedent to regional organisation-building during the pre-WWII colonial period of 1918–1945, just as economics became the driving force once the colonial structures had been shaken off. Regional organisations at that time were developed by external actors during a period of fading imperialism, and were divided between the long-existing European colonialists, the imperialist challenger Japan and the anti-colonial United States. It is this colonial history that continues to make many regional actors wary of security-oriented organisation-building.

In the early post-WWII period up to the 1954 Geneva Conference, regional organisation-building was still a colonial affair. Three groupings of proposals for regional organisations emerged – those initiated by the West, local anti-West proposals and regionally led pro-West proposals. For the West, or rather the Europeans, the zeitgeist of the time, given US anti-imperialism was to shift from colonial control to post-colonial 'federations'. This resulted in the following short-lived organisations. Britain's WWII era South East Asia Command (SEAC) was scaled back in favour of bilateral arrangements due to differences between UK and US security visions for East Asia. Britain helped to create the Malay Federation (1948), and instituted Crown colony rule in Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak. The United States went about signing bilateral security agreements with Thailand in 1950 and the Philippines in 1951. Holland transitioned their colonial possession of Indonesia from the Dutch East Indies into the United States of Indonesia (USI) in 1948. France transformed its French Empire into the French Union in 1946, and then went about conforming to the federalist zeitgeist of the time by gathering together southern Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into the Indochinese Federation in 1946 and subsequently folding that into the French Union.

Western imperialism also drove local attempts at organisation-building intended to provide a bulwark against reinvigorated Western imperialism. Some were attempted in the Communist bloc. Ho Chi Minh attempted to link the Communist

parties of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into the Indochinese Communist Party from 1930. The anti-Empire of Japan-oriented Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement attempted to link together the overseas Chinese diaspora with motherland China. Some local efforts were also attempted in the pro-Western capitalist camp. Thailand's foremost liberal of the time, Pridi Banomyong, proposed in 1947 (with UK backing) a nationalist populated anti-communist grouping based out of Bangkok – the South-East Asia League (SEAL). India's Nehru saw an opening for former colonies to unite against their colonial masters and proposed an Asian Organisation at the Indian Council of World Affairs' Asian Relations Conference in 1947, and attempted again in 1949 to form a South-Southeast Asian, Indo-centric organisation to resist Western imperialism. The Philippines proposed a NATO-like arrangement in 1949 with the Pacific Pact, albeit under the US security umbrella but seemingly with lukewarm support from the United States itself.

Western attempts to remain as definers of the regional order complicated efforts by local states to develop regional cooperation. The 1954 Geneva Conference had left France's Indochina problem nominally but unsatisfactorily settled, and heralded the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) – a NATO for the region. However the UK and the United States were divided over its role and as such it was not provided with any NATO-like collective defence responsibilities, nor was it provided with a standing military force. It did however mean the continued presence of Western actors in the region. This caused major issues for regional organisation-building; Indonesia under Sukarno came to regard regional organisations as Trojan horses for continued Western interests, for example.

The seeds of non-alignment as a response to this lingering 'post-colonialism' began to be developed by Indonesia at the 1955 Bandung Conference, an attempt to build broad anti-imperialist cooperation. Indonesia had taken the lead – and succeeded – in forcing through the notion of a neutralised Southeast Asia, with the tacit blessing of a UK that had considered favourably the idea of a neutral region.[25] In 1966 Thailand (but really representing Indonesia) proposed a collective security arrangement – the Southeast Asia Association for Regional Cooperation – that required the removal of US bases in the region. The proposal failed due to the United States' role with its regional security partners and their desires to maintain US security guarantees, although Thailand later bilaterally removed its US bases by the early 1970s. The scaling back of British security guarantees with a shift from the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement of 1957 to the Five Power Defense Arrangements in 1971 was immediately seized upon by Indonesia to create ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) thereby turning Southeast Asia into a non-aligned region.

Some great powers did attempt to replace the reduced UK-centric power vacuum with their own security-based organisational frameworks. The USSR attempted and failed twice with their Asian Collective Security proposals in 1969

and 1972. Lingering desires from India to play an inter-regional/post-colonial compatriot type role also came to naught after siding with the USSR with the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The United States established Pacific-level military exercises during the 1970s and 1980s – the Rim of the Pacific Exercise from 1971; the Pacific Armies Management Seminar from 1978; the Cobra Gold annual exercises from 1982; and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium from 1988. These have grown to include various Southeast and East Asian states, but have not fostered any ‘harder’ form of organisational security apparatus. The USSR responded to these Pacific activities by proposing in 1986 and again in 1998 a Pacific Ocean Conference. Both failed due to lack of engagement from East Asian states. China came late to such efforts but joined with by Russia to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, initiated in 1996, which attempts to build cooperation not ‘vertically’ (down through the Asia-Pacific) but ‘horizontally’ (across Eurasia). Arguably, this China-centred organisation has proved more successful than Russia’s pan-East Asia proposals, but remains limited in East Asian membership.

The most that appears possible in the post-Cold War period is for the creation of region-wide ‘talking shops’ that do not commit to any formal obligations. The launching of the Pacific-wide talking shop of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), both in 1993, revealed once more the preference for ASEAN-rooted, albeit externally engaged, organisation-building.[26] Supported by the Bangkok Treaty signed two years later in 1995 that reiterated Southeast Asia as a non-aligned (in this case, nuclear-free) region, multiple but toothless dialogue organisations have been generated, and attempts to upgrade the ARF have met with limited success.

Extant but Weak Organisations: Local Political Cultures, Local Political Suspicions

The ASEAN Economic Community came into being in 2015 and the agreement of a roadmap for 2025 has been an achievement, but it has been a rocky historical process and not one without lingering problems. With the ASEAN integration process appearing promising in the 1970s, multilateral economic efforts began through the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific aiming at regional integration. However, attempts by the UN to create Preferential Tariff Arrangements in 1977, the ASEAN Industrial Projects Scheme in 1980, ASEAN Industrial Cooperation in 1981 and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures in 1982 failed due to the application of Europe-inspired functionalist economic initiatives. The fundamental political problem of the day was that few states were thinking regionally and even if they were, the initiative would have to emerge locally rather than being imposed.[27] These problems and new ones reside within the AEC today. One issue is that with the vast array of overlapping trade regimes now in existence it is difficult to discern where the AEC sits among

them. Second is the lack of awareness among the people and the businesses of Southeast Asia in terms of what the AEC is or of any benefits it creates.[28] Third is the remaining divergence of economic levels among the AEC economies. For example, it is difficult to consider how businesses in Cambodia are meant to compete with those in developed Thailand. The AEC, while fairly significant, should still be regarded as a work in progress rather than a destination reached.

In wider East Asia terms, when attempts have been made to either broaden regional organisation into an East Asia or Asia-Pacific economic bloc, or to widen integration beyond the economic dimension into deeper political and especially security cooperation, problems have been encountered. South Korea's ambitious proposal in 1970 to build on ASEAN integration and form an Asian Common Market resulted in little. In 1990 proposals for a free trade area – the East Asia Economic Group – were made by Malaysia's Mahatir bin Mohamad that implied an 'Asia for Asians' philosophy that would exclude the United States and Australia. Japan helped scupper the proposal. Instead, the more bilateral in orientation ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 took on a similar if diluted function. Attempts to move from the hubs-and-spokes 'ASEAN+' model towards a pan-regional trade bloc have gained little traction. Japan's efforts to develop wider FTAs, first by building on ASEAN+3 in 2004 by proposing the East Asia Free Trade Area that would exclude Australia and New Zealand, and then to build on ASEAN+6 in 2009 by proposing the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia, both led to naught because of ASEAN's desire to safeguard its position as the bridge-building hub of any efforts at wider East Asia/Pacific organisation-building. Similarly, proposals in 2009 for political cooperation resulting from increasing economic cooperation – one from Japan with the East Asian Community concept that resulted from Malaysia's 2004 East Asia Summit, and one from Australia with the Asia Pacific Community proposal – did not result in long-term cooperation.

At the Pacific level also, the success rate has been equally as mixed. Japan and Australia began attempting to leverage Southeast Asia's integration into Pacific integration as early as the 1960s. Japan's business community had proposed the notion of a Pacific economic community as early as 1962 and the notion was being considered politically by Japan, Australia and the United States. However, the United States argued that it was too early and scuppered further discussion until the gestation of APEC at the closing of the 1980s.[29] Attempts to deepen these and further promote the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept would by 1980 – with the joint Japan–Australia proposed Pacific Economic Cooperation Council – simply result in a series of talking shops for intellectuals and various levels of other elites.

These proposals often failed due to a lack of cooperation among Northeast Asian states, with the United States often being involved somewhere. At various points since the early 1990s a Japan–Korea FTA or a China–Japan–Korea FTA have been raised but never instituted, and this is despite the proliferation during a

concordant period of bilateral and regional FTAs. South Korea has floated, with the support of Japan, the idea of a North East Asian Development Bank that has been discouraged by the United States.[30] Furthermore, despite the mishandling of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis by the IMF and Japan's dissatisfaction with the IMF's preoccupation with market mechanisms,[31] Japan's proposals for an Asian Monetary Fund were rejected, leaving Japan embarrassed.[32] Despite the plans having the support of many Asian countries, they were not supported by the United States and the IMF, and the United States even lobbied China to reject the plan out of concerns of 'Japanese hegemony'.[33] The most that has been achieved are moves towards currency coordination with the Asian Bond Market Initiative (2002), the impractical Asian Monetary Unit proposal (2005) and the Chiang Mai Initiative (2010). They have not progressed in the same way as the European Currency Unit, facilitated by the Euro, however they do appear to be achieving their primary purpose of managing region-affecting currency fluctuations.

In relation to security, attempts to upgrade the ARF have been very limited. Indonesia's ASEAN Security Community of 2003 – the Bali Concord II plan – has come the closest but shown limited development, with the best that has been achieved being the talking shops of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting from 2006, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings Plus from 2010 and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum from 2012. Anything more substantial and larger than this, for example, the 2002-initiated Shangri-La Dialogue, has the potential to overly 'warm-up' East Asian relations as global power rivalries surface more easily. This occurred at the 2015 Shangri-la Dialogue event when China's activities in the South China Sea were openly criticised by the United States and Japan. Little has resulted that could be considered tangible enough to move the ARF's 'cooperative security' arrangements towards a 'collective security' position as in the UN or NATO.

In broader East Asia/Pacific level security terms, progress has been even less pronounced. Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, spurred on by increasingly assertive China naval activity in the South China Seas, proposed a range of new security apparatus for Southeast and East Asian security organisation. However, Japan's 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue/Quadrilateral Initiative that would join the United States, Japan, Australia and India into what Prime Minister Abe called a 'security diamond' that would form an 'arc of democracy', failed. So too did Japan's proposal in 2015 to create East Asia's first permanent organisation for maritime cooperation with the Asian Maritime Organisation for Security and Cooperation. There seems little progress or interest in these Japanese proposals – except from Vietnam – unless they are economic in nature. Even in the face of constant crisis, such as nuclear developments on the Korean peninsula, it has proven difficult to build much beyond 'loose' security organisations. The US-initiated Six Party Talks since 2003 on North Korea's nuclear weapons programme have yielded little development and only more missile launches from North Korea. These have been met by a 2013 South Korea Northeast Asia

Peace and Cooperation Initiative, supported by Japan, in addition to a 2016 South Korea-proposed Five Party Talks (which excludes North Korea), both of which have not amounted to much, and the latter being seemingly counter-productive.

THE TRANSITIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Against this complex and fragmented patchwork of organisations in East and Southeast Asia, pressures arising from the transitional international order are also affecting *how* these arrangements are evolving. Principally this is being driven by what has been dubbed by various analysts as the 'G2' – China and the United States.[34]

New Players, New Rivalries: China

China has long since passed the time when it was a developing country and is now able not only to put pressure on existing organisations but also to create its own. 2001 marked China's 10th five-year economic plan and with it came a policy shift with the government's 'go global' strategy that aimed to shift the country from a recipient of FDI to generator of FDI, with the vast majority going to East Asia.[35] By 2015, China began to make it clear that it was going to begin offering alternatives to the prevailing Western-led, Asia-Pacific visions detailed in the previous section. In rapid succession, China first moved to multilateralise and regionalise its aid and investment. In 2014 China created the Silk Road Fund for investment in energy-rich Eurasia to the West of China. In 2015 the New Development Bank – the so-called BRICs Bank – was established. In turn, in 2016, a regional challenger to the Japan/US-dominated ADB was established with the opening of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Despite public statements in favour of cooperation, Japan and the United States did not join the AIIB, being wrong-footed by many European economies and Australia who did. These investment funds also emerged against the backdrop of the Peoples Bank of China attempting from 2013 to internationalise China's currency, the renminbi, with the creation of so-called 'dim sum bonds' and the Shanghai Free Trade Zone.

Not only in finance but also in trade, China is a rising challenger. In response to the increased traction of the US-proposed Trans Pacific Partnership that was finally agreed in 2016, China proposed the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific.[36] With the bilateral ASEAN–China FTA already being the most populous free trade zone in the world, attempts to enlarge it Pacific-wide would arguably position East Asia as a significant challenger to a global economic order centred on the West. Bolstered by the fact that China is predicted by 2020 to become the world's largest source of foreign investment,[37] that centre of gravity may indeed have already shifted.

This is inevitably creating concerns for the existing status quo players. Japan's strong economic presence in China's southern-side Mekong peninsula countries is being felt. From 2008, Japan began attempting to shift Mekong states away from the ADB-spearheaded Greater Mekong Subregion project, towards a Mekong integration project better connected to Tokyo. Agreeing to a list of development projects under the framework, Japan began using its economic power for a more overly geo-political effect by attempting to move and alter the objectives of existing organisations. China's response was the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework, a carbon copy of Japan's own cooperation frameworks with the GMS sub-region, but from a neighbour much closer to the region than Japan is.

Challenging the United States and the West is a different matter, however, and China's foreign policy, encapsulated through its efforts at organisation-building, exhibit a more cautious approach that essentially seeks similar levels of prosperity and political parity with the United States and the West.[38] Aside from issues in the South China Seas, China is not intent on confrontation with the West. In 2012, Peking University's Dean of International Studies, Wang Jisi, proposed a strategy which explicitly enunciated the need for China to avoid confrontation in its rise, and the best way to achieve this, according to Jisi, was his Look/Go/March West Strategy.[39] That is, understanding that the United States takes a keen interest in all matters related to the Malacca Strait, China's focus should be oriented westwards rather than southwards. It is possible to witness this reflected in the government of China's New Silk Road Policy, a major energy and infrastructure construction programme – the 'One Belt One Road' framework (now recently referred to as the Built Road Initiative). This 'Look West' concept also explains the emphasis China is making in building organisations that include Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia connections, in addition to East Asian states. Indeed, if China seriously wanted to challenge the West in global organisational terms, it has been able to since WWII through its membership of the UN Security Council, yet rarely does so. Despite often voting with the USSR/Russia in support of the principle of state sovereignty over humanitarian intervention, for the period 1945–2014, at ten uses, China has been the least active employer of its veto power compared with the United States (77) and Russia (68).[40] Still, at the regional level, China's 'air defence identification zone' has put down an assertive marker, and initiatives such as these overshadow, and problematize, all efforts to establish regularised regional cooperation. This gap between China's actions globally and actions regionally is a key point of dissonance for how many view China's 'peaceful rise' ambitions.[41]

The United States and the Liberal Order

The post-war liberal order and its multilateral institutions possess a staggered record of acceptance of East Asian states (see Appendix 14.C), yet it is this

creaking liberal architecture that the United States seeks to uphold. Diplomatically, membership of the UN for East Asian states occurred in broadly three 'waves' (see Appendix 14.D). The first wave in the 1940s was associated with the Allies; the second wave came in the 1950s post-Colombo Plan period; and the third wave emerged from the 1960s onwards as national divisions were eventually resolved. In security terms, membership of the nuclear weapons body, the IAEA, developed along two waves that reflected geo-political concerns about great powers in the region. Most of the core ASEAN members who desired a non-aligned Southeast Asia joined in 1957 at the time of the IAEA's creation, as did Japan and Cold War hot spot South Korea. Following this initial flurry, late-comers joined in a trickle, each having their own circumstances and outlooks regarding nuclear weapons to take into account. Along the economic dimension, the world's oldest global financial institution – the Bank for International Settlements – began accepting non-Western banks from the 1960s, as the Bank of Japan slowly began to be accepted. It would not be until 1981 that Northeast Asia would see another BIS member join in the form of the Peoples Bank of China. After this initial, and slow-moving, first wave, the BIS began opening up to East Asia. A second wave of new members were invited from 1996 that comprised mainly the former 'tiger economies' and then a third wave from 1999 with key ASEAN state banks. Membership of the OECD, G8 and G20 – the rich clubs of global organisations – is dependent on economic development levels, so they would remain locked to many East Asian economies.

While global organisations have usually remained closed to most states of East Asia over the post-WWII period, regional economic organisations have been enthusiastically formed and joined, and this is something that the United States has sometimes found threatening.[42] When the ADB was established in 1966 almost every state in East Asia joined immediately. Equally, when China initiated the AIIB in 2015 there was, again, wide acceptance. As a result the United States has rebuffed or sabotaged many additional attempts by regional actors to create organisations that may develop the potential to dilute or exclude US power from the region. This tends to be achieved with the help of one of its regional partners – usually Japan or Australia – through their presenting alternatives that will 'keep the United States engaged in the region'. There have been multiple attempts since WWII to recreate Western-originated multilateral organisations in the East Asia region. SEATO in 1954 was to be a model of NATO for the region, and South Korea's Asian and Pacific Treaty Organization proposal in 1966 was a further attempt at something similar. Australia attempted to create a Pacific OECD-like organisation with the Organization for Pacific Trade and Development proposal in 1989. South Korea attempted, in 1993, to recreate the World Bank/IMF architecture at the regional level with the NEADB, and Japan sought the same in 1997 with the AMF. Japan's attempts in 2015 to promote the Asian Maritime Organisation for Security and Cooperation was a desire to replicate Europe's OSCE. Each time the United States feels threatened by regional organisations

that it is not involved in, it reverts to promoting traditional multilateral organisations or only new organisations in which it is involved.

However, the United States is increasingly appearing impotent in a region rife with change.[43] Economically, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis remains a key case study for how global organisations, and the United States through them, can use crisis in order to engineer desirable (to them) structural change and reconfigure politico-economic structures.[44] The lingering distrust in Southeast Asia at the IMF's failure to contain the 1997 crisis has led many in the region to become open to economic measures of self-defence (such as an openness to new financial instruments) that it is hoped will provide a bulwark against perceived meddling, ineffectual, or biased global organisations.[45] There may also be a renewed willingness to turn inwards towards the region and become more open to the organisational ideas of regional leader states such as Japan, Australia or China. In security terms, the glaring inability of the United States to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue demonstrates the realism and potential weakness of US security guarantees. The United States' impotence with North Korea is also increasingly being matched by impotence in dealing with what it and its allies regard as aggressive behaviour from China. China is being left free to rise unchallenged in East Asia, resulting in various disputes. Japan–China conflicts over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in which China is challenging both ownership of the islands, the sea and the airspace, have left the United States seemingly paralysed. Coupled with the difficulty of dealing with China's wider regional territorial claims, US authority appears paper-thin.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has addressed two main points in relation to global and regional organisations in East Asia. The first is the nature of these organisations, how they have developed and the challenges they have encountered. This is addressed within three themes: organisations that have become consolidated, proposals for organisations that have failed and organisations that have come into being but are either weak or failing. The second main focus of the chapter is to address what the current 'transitional order' means for these organisations. This is addressed using two themes: the rise of China and whether this is challenging the prevailing international order, and the role of the United States within this rapidly changing region. The chapter demonstrates that there is a greater chance for organisations in East Asia to emerge if they are oriented around economic and trade issues, and as free as possible from great power rivalries. Security cooperation has also not taken root in the region amid bilateral ties. It is also possible to conclude that the strength of regional organisations is geographically based, with Southeast Asia generating relatively stable organisations, Northeast Asia barely able to muster much cooperation, and efforts at generating East Asia wide or pan-Pacific organisations limited.

In relation to the nature of the transitional international order and organisations in East Asia, it is possible to conclude that the rise of China is likely to destabilise some aspects of the existing status quo, but this may result from a broader regional lack of satisfaction with the existing status quo. For a long time the United States or its regional proxies have scuppered efforts at greater regional organisation-building in favour of protecting the authority of global multilateral organisations where the United States (and others in the West) are dominant. Now, with the rise of China, a power has emerged that possesses the capacity to give voice to the long-time quiet discontent of many in the region. The key to managing this transition, and maintaining relative stability, is for there to be either a greater acceptance of China's power and organisational initiatives – for example if the United States or Japan were to join the China-led AIIB – or to allow for a greater strength and range of regional organisations to emerge that could provide a counterbalance to China. The latter of these two options would justifiably be regarded by China as provocative, so it would be desirable if there could be a broader acceptance of China's initiatives. It is possible to project forward from these conclusions and predict a period of heightened instability that will be impossible to channel safely through robust organisations, because they do not exist. Due to the weakness of the UN, it is hardly likely to act as a multilateral replacement for weak regionalisation. Region watchers will need to remain keenly focused on the development of the AIIB and its relationship with the ADB, as well as the deepening of the AEC project.

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Appendix 14.A Summary of East and Southeast Asian regional organisation since WWII

	Security	*Economic*	*Politico-diplomatic*
East Asia (including Southeast Asia)	Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) (1971) (US led)	UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) (1947) later, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (1974)	Bandung Conference ('Asian African Summit') (1955)
	Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) (1978) (US led)	Colombo Plan (1950)	Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) (1996)
	Cobra Gold annual exercises (1982) (US led)	Asian Development Bank formed (1966)	Asia Cooperation Dialogue (2002)
	Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) (1988) (US led)	The Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) (1967)	East Asia Summit (EAS) (2005)
	Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) (1993)	Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) (1968)	New Asian–African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) (2005)
	Shangri-La Dialogues (SLD) (2002)	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) (1980)	
		Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (1989)	
		ASEAN+3 (1997)	
		Indian-Ocean Rim Association (IORA) (1997)	
		ASEAN+6 (2005) (agreed at the East Asia Summit)	
		China's Silk Road Fund founded (2014)	
		New Development Bank (NDB) aka BRICs Bank formed (2015)	
		Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank opened (AIIB) (2016)	
		Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (2016)	

Southeast Asia	South East Asia Command (SEAC) (1943–1946)	ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (1992) ('Common Effective Preferential Tariff') (CEPT)	Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) (1930)
	US–Thailand military pact (1950)	Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) (1992)	Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement (1937)
	US–Philippines military pact (1951)	Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT–GT) (1993)	Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) (1961) [Thailand, Philippines, Malaya]
	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) (1954)	Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-The Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) (1994)	MAPHILINDO (Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia) (1963)
	Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (1957)	Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA) (1999)	Ministerial Conference for the Development of Southeast Asia (MEDSEA) (1967–1974)
	Five Power Defence Arrangements (1971)	Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) (2000)	Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967) [now including Indonesia], formed with the Bangkok Declaration
	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971)	ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) (2015)	ASEAN expansion (1995–1999) [1995 – Vietnam; 1997 – Laos and Burma; 1999 – Cambodia]
	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976)		Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) (2009)
	ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (1993)		ASEAN – Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ministerial meetings (2009)
	The Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) *aka*. Bangkok Treaty (1995)		ASEAN-Pacific Alliance (2015)
	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) (2006)		ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together, launched
	ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings Plus (ADMM+) (2010)		
	Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) (2012)		

Source: authors

Appendix 14.B Failed/failing proposals for regional organisation since WWII

	Proposing actor	*Idea*	*Reaction to/desire to*	*Reason for failure*
Security	Philippines	Pacific Pact (1949) - a US-backed, anti-Communist, NATO-type grouping	Reaction to developing Communist movements in Southeast Asia	Lukewarm support from the United States.
	Thailand (but Indonesia in origin)	Southeast Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC) (1966)	A desire to bring Indonesia into the anti-Communist group of Southeast Asian states by proposing collective security responsibilities that would be handled by Southeast Asian powers themselves, with the military bases of foreign powers (for instance the United States) being removed.	Resisted by the Philippines and Singapore who wanted to keep their US security guarantees.
	South Korea	Asia Pacific Treaty Organisation (APATO) (1966)	Possibly secretly proposed by the United States, it represented a desire to organise an Asia Pacific anti-communist coalition that could block China's admission to the UN.	An Asia-Pacific-wide focus was too large. It became the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC), however, lingering suspicions over Japan's involvement in East Asia caused problems.
	USSR	Asian Collective Security proposal by Leonid Brezhnev (1969, again 1972)	Desire to counter China in addition to reducing Western (US) influence in the region	Vague proposal leading to lack of engagement, in addition to strong US opposition.
	USSR	Pacific Ocean Conference proposal, similar to the Helsinki Accords' CSCE (1986, again in 1998)		Strong opposition from the United States
	China	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (1996)	Reaction to NATO/desire for a rising China to multilateralise	Still in progress, however aside from some summits, tangible institutions or cooperation is unclear
	Indonesia	ASEAN Security Community (ASC) (2003) aka Bali Concord II[1]	To reinvigorate ASEAN after the Asian Financial Crisis; to build on the ARF	Still in progress, however, little has resulted, and suspicions may linger over Indonesia's intent.

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	United States	Six Party Talks on North Korea (2003)	Desire to de-escalate nuclear weapons development on the Korean peninsula	Lack of progress made, with parties regularly walking away and intermittently attending.
	Japan	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue/ Quadrilateral Initiative (QSD) (2007)	Response to increased activity from China and the desire by Japan's Shinzo Abe to establish an 'arc of democracy' with the QSD (or in Abe's words the 'security diamond') as its core	Failed the following year after Australia withdrew.
	South Korea	Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) (2013)	Reaction to increased nuclear weapon activity in North Korea	Still in progress, but little cooperative institutionalism has developed.
	Japan	Asian Maritime Organisation for Security and Cooperation (AMOSC) (2015)	Desire to create East Asia's first permanent regional maritime organisation and replicate Europe's OSCE	Still in progress, but unclear how much support the United States will provide.
	South Korea	Five Party Talks (2016)	Reaction to North Korea's continued belligerence and lack of engagement in the Six Party Talks process.	Only recently proposed but doubts exist as it proposes talks about an actor that is then excluded from those talks.
Economic	South Korea	Asian Common Market (1970)	Similar to the other Regional Trade Arrangement of the time, the purpose was national interest rather than regionally oriented only.	Insufficient incentives from trading partners.
	UN	Preferential Tariff Arrangements (PTAs) (1977)[2]	Desire to increase ASEAN economic inter-dependence	National interests rather than regional focus of ASEAN members, and/or lack of technical capacity to fulfil the plans.

(Continued)

Appendix 14.B Continued

Proposing actor	Idea	Reaction to/desire to	Reason for failure
	ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) Scheme (1976, projects approval 1980)[3] ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (1981)[4] ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) (1982)[5]		
Japan	Asian Network (1988)	A desire to generate a Tokyo-centred Asian Industries Development (AID) plan, and a reaction to the shifting nature of the Japanese economy (requiring greater outsourcing and offshoring).	Arguably still in progress and the backbone of Japan's regional post-Cold War foreign policy, a 'one region' vision centred on Tokyo is difficult to imagine for many.
Australia	Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD) (1989)	Proposed by PM Bob Hawke, but brainchild of Kojima Kiyoshi and Peter Drysdale, OPTAD would be East Asia's OECD.	Helped pave the way for APEC, but the proposal itself needed further political acceptance rather than just academic.
Malaysia	East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) aka East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) (1990)	Reaction to APEC and US regional involvement	Opposition from the United States (and Japan)
South Korea	North East Asian Development Bank (NEADB) (1993)	Desire to integrate North Korea in regional cooperation	Opposition from the United States
Japan	Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) (1997)	Reaction to IMF mishandling of the Asian Financial Crisis	Opposition from the United States (and Japan)
Japan	East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA, excludes Australia and New Zealand) (2004)	Desire to building an FTA on the basis of ASEAN+3	Lack of cooperation among Northeast Asian '+3' states

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	Japan	Asian Monetary Unit (AMU) (2005)	Reaction to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the inability to create an AMF, and modelled on the European Currency Unit (ECU). A currency basket approach was suggested (a bundle of 13 Asian currencies to hedge against currency shifts)	Difficult to integrate into global finance due to yen vs renminbi differences.[6]
	Japan	Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) (2009)	Desire to build an FTA on the basis of ASEAN+6	Lack of cooperation among Northeast Asian '+3' states
	ASEAN	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (2011)	Reaction to the exclusivity of the TPP that excludes China	Still in progress but the RCEP has replaced references to both the EAFTA and CEPEA in extra-ASEAN negotiations.[7]
	China	Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) (2014)	Reaction to the US-backed TPP	Still in progress, however seeming unlikely given the pro-United States positions of many in the region and past behaviour of Japan and Australia
Politico-diplomatic	Britain	South-East Asia League (SEAL) (1947), proposed by Thailand's Pridi Banomyong	A desire to combat Communist developments by uniting a collection of nationalists based out of Bangkok.	Other colonial powers returned too strongly.
	India	Asian Organisation proposal by Nehru at the Indian Council of World Affairs – Asian Relations Conference (1947).[8]	Desire by Nehru to draw together all developing anti-colonial movements under Indian rather than British auspices.	Southeast Asian states' reluctance to move forward under either Indian or Chinese superpower masters.

(Continued)

Appendix 14.B Continued

	Proposing actor	Idea	Reaction to/desire to	Reason for failure
	Malaya Federation	Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty (1959)	Reaction to regional organisations with security objectives aimed at combatting communism, and a desire to develop economic-based regional organisations	National interests, principally concerns from Indonesia.
	Australia	Asia Pacific Community (APC) (2009)	Desire to develop on ASEAN+3/+6 and maintain US engagement in the region.	In progress, situation remains unclear but unlikely.
	Japan (and Malaysia)	East Asian Community (EAC) (2009), resulting from Malaysia's 2004 East Asia Summit	Desire to build on ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit	Lack of cooperation among Northeast Asian '+3' states

Source: authors

[1] This plan, according to Indonesia, was not to form a military alliance as per SEATO but, instead, a comprehensive security alliance including political, economic, social and cultural dimensions rather than a defence pact, military alliance or joint foreign policy. It relies on norm-setting, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building rather than military force. It does, however, call for the addressing of maritime security in addition to the establishment of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force.

[2] This plan focused on trade as an integrating force, and proposed that certain ASEAN tariff lines would be given preferential treatment (with many exclusions allowed, however). States did not want to focus on ASEAN trade and wanted to maintain a long exclusion list of protected goods.

[3] This plan focused on industrialisation, with five large collectively beneficial industrial projects agreed – one allocated for each country and the outputs shared by all. States would not agree to limit their industrial productivity to a singular dimension.

[4] This plan brought in the private sector more, and focused on the development of horizontalised production chains. Industries would operate across multiple ASEAN economies to produce a finally finished product for extra-regional export. National interests again were dominant as countries vied for the higher-value products (final assembly goods) to be located in their country.

[5] This plan was private-sector oriented again, but with an emphasis on the private sector side. Rather than governments deciding where a production chain would develop, the private sector would decide through the construction of local joint ventures. However, again, national interests won out; to implement this plan would have required liberalised tariff arrangements to allow joint ventures to benefit from each other, and national governments were unwilling to do so.

[6] The basket would need one currency to act as an anchor for the rest, of which the most likely would be the yen or the renminbi. However, with Japan floating their currency but China controlling theirs, politically choosing one would be difficult.

[7] ADB, Asia Regional Integration Center [online] *East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN+3).* Available at https://aric.adb.org/fta/east-asia-free-trade-area-(asean3) (accessed 17.04.2016)

[8] Nehru attempted again in 1949 to form a South–Southeast Asian organisation to resist Western imperialism, but failed.

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Appendix 14.C Membership of key global organisations by East Asian States

	DIPLOMACY	FINANCE					TRADE					SECURITY
	UN (1945)	*World Bank (1944)*	*IMF (1945)*	*BIS (1930)*	*ADB (1966)*	*AIIB (2015)*	*GATT (1948)*	*WTO (1995)*	*OECD (1961)*	*G8 (1975)*	*G20 (1999)*	*IAEA (1957)*
NORTHEAST ASIA												
Japan	1956	1952	1952	1994[1]	1966	–	1955	1995	1964	1975	1999	1957
PR China	1945	1945	1945	1996[2]	1986	2015	–	2001	–	–	1999	1984
South Korea (Republic of)	1991[3]	1955	1955	1996[4]	1966	2015	1967	1995	1996	–	1999	1957
North Korea (Democratic Peoples Republic)	1991[5]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Hong Kong	–	–	–	1996[6]	1969	–	1986	1995	–	–	–	–
Taiwan	–	–[7]	–[8]	–	–[9]	–	1965[10]	2002	–	–	–	–
SOUTHEAST ASIA												
Malaysia	1957	1958	1958	1999	1966	2015	1957	1995	–	–	–	1969
Indonesia	1950	1967	1954	2003[11]	1966	2015	1950	1995	–	–	1999	1957
Philippines	1945	1945	1945	2003	1966	2015	1979	1995	–	–	–	1958
Singapore	1965	1966[12]	1966	1996	1966	2015	1973	1995	–	–	–	1969
Thailand	1946	1949	1949	1999	1966	2015	1982	1995	–	–	–	1957
Brunei Darussalam	1984	1995[13]	1995	–	2006	2015	1993	1995	–	–	–	2014
Cambodia	1955	1970	1969	–	1966	2015	–	2004	–	–	–	2009
Laos	1955	1961	1961	–	1966	2015	–	2013	–	–	–	2011
Myanmar	1948	1952	1952	–	1973	2015	1948	1995	–	–	–	1957
Vietnam	1977	1956	1956	–	1966	2015	–	2007	–	–	–	1957

Source: authors

[1] 1961 – account requested; 1963 – monthly visits begin; 1964 – began attending Eurocurrency meetings and other meetings as a member; 1967 – began attending monthly governor meetings; 1970 – BIS shares bought; 1994 – board member nation status
[2] 1981 – established relations; 1996 – full membership established
[3] 1948 – observer status; 1991– full status agreed along with North Korea
[4] 1991 – began attending executive meetings; 1996 – full membership attained
[5] 1971 – observer status; 1991 – full status agreed along with South Korea
[6] 1996 – full membership established (along with China)
[7] 1944 – founding member, removed under protest from China in 1980
[8] 1945 – founding member, removed under protest from China in 1980
[9] 1966 – founding member, removed under protest from China in 1986
[10] 1965 – given observer status, removed under protest from China in 1971, later restored in 1992
[11] 1999 – full membership invited; 2003 – full membership invited (second time)
[12] Singapore would join later once independent of Malaysia
[13] Joined many organisations once independence from the UK was achieved in 1984 and industrial development using natural resource wealth could occur

Appendix 14.D Waves of East Asia's integration with global organisations

Organisation	*Wave*	*Description*
UN	1	Post-WWII founding members (1945>)
	2	Post-Colombo Plan (1950>)
	3	Divided country later-comers (1965>)
World Bank & IMF	1	Post-WWII members (1945>)
	2	Post-Colombo Plan (1950>)
	3	Post-Geneva Conference (1955>)
BIS	1	North East Asian states (1960>)
	2	Tiger economies (1996>)
	3	Key ASEAN states (1999>)
ADB	1	Founding member states (1966>)
	2	Latecomers (1969>)
AIIB	1	Founding members (2015>)
WTO	1	Pre-existing GATT members converted after reform (1995>)
	2	Transitioning Communist states (2001>)
OECD	1	Japan (1964>)
	2	South Korea (1996>)
G8	1	Japan (1975>)
G20	1	Japan (1964>)
	2	South Korea (1996>)
IAEA	1	Non-aligned SE Asia and nuclear-prohibited Japan and South Korea (1957>)
	2	Latecomers (1969>)

Source: authors

Note 1: WB, IMF, GATT and WTO are not included as there are no recognisable trends in membership of these Bretton Woods institutions. States seemed to join for individual reasons and at different times.

Note 2: The OECD, G8 and G20 are not included because they are dependent on economic development status alone, rather than the more politico-economic criteria of the other institutions.

Note 3: The AIIB is not included because it is a very new organisation in addition to having unanimous accidence upon its creation